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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher Scott Franks appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
the incriminating statements he made to his jailer while under threat of being strip-searched. At
the time he made his statements, Mr. Franks was a detainee at the Ada County Jail. Four
uniformed officers entered his cell and he and his cellmates were ordered up against a wall,
handcuffed, and told they would be strip-searched and then led way. While isolated with the
deputy in a shower room, and in response to the deputy’s questioning as to whether he had
“anything illegal” on him, Mr. Franks made incriminating statements – without having the
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).
The district court denied suppression, concluding that Mr. Franks was not “in custody”
for Miranda purposes, that he clearly knew he had the right to counsel and to not answer the
officer’s questions, and that his incriminating statements were voluntarily made. However,
under a correct application of the law, suppression is required because Mr. Franks was in custody
within the meaning of Miranda. Suppression is also required because the State failed to meet its
burden of showing that the statements were voluntarily made and not coerced. This Court should
reverse.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were presented and considered in connection with Mr. Franks’
motion to suppress.1 On May 30, 2017, Mr. Franks was in his cell at the Ada County Jail

1

Mr. Franks testified and the State called Officer Zuberer. (Tr., p.11, L.5 – p.60, L.2.) Officer
Zuberer’s report also was admitted. (Tr., p.58, Ls.14-16; Ex.A.)
1

awaiting trial on charges unrelated to this case.2 Early that morning, sheriff’s deputy Mike
Zuberer received a tip from an unnamed inmate that there were drugs in Mr. Franks’ cell. (Ex.A;
Tr., p.57, Ls.13-15.)3 Officer Zuberer reviewed Mr. Franks’ “Telmate”4 account and noticed
numerous money transactions within in the past few days. (Ex.A.) Based on that information,
Officer Zuberer “decided to make a plan of attack” to search Mr. Franks’ cell and inmates who
may have been involved. (Ex.A.) Officer Zuberber and three other uniformed officers “racked
open” Mr. Franks’ cell, entered the cell, ordered Mr. Franks and his three cellmates out of their
cell and up against the wall, facing it, and to put their hands behind their backs, then secured
them in handcuffs. (Tr., p.11, L.11 – p.12, L.18; p.42, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Franks was informed that
he and the others were being taken to the jail booking area to be strip-searched. (Tr., p.10,
Ls.10-24.) Handcuffed, Mr. Franks and his cellmates were led away by the officers down to the
booking area and lined up against the wall; they were then separated and taken one-by-one into
the shower area to be strip-searched. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-24; Ex.A.)
When it was his turn to be strip-searched, Mr. Franks was asked by Officer Zuberber
whether he was carrying “anything illegal.” (Tr., p.45, Ls.23-25; Ex.A.) In response to the
officer’s question, Mr. Franks said “No,” but nodded his head indicating “yes” at the same time.
(Tr., p.15, L.2 – p.16, L.5; p.34, Ls.9-20; Ex.A.) Mr. Franks then reached inside his pants, pulled
out a sock – later determined to contain heroin – and gave it to the officer. (Tr., p.40, L.7; Ex.A.)

2

Mr. Franks was being held on charges of grand theft. (1/30/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-11.) See State v.
Franks, Ada County No. CR01-17-15718. Mr. Franks later entered a guilty plea in that case on
October 26, 2017.
3
The suppression hearing took place on January 30, 2018; unless otherwise indicated by a
different date, all transcript references are to that hearing.
4
Telmate is the system used by Ada County Sheriff to deposit funds for inmates. See
https://adacounty.id.gov/sheriff/ada-county-jail/mail-payments/ontransact.
2

Mr. Franks was not advised of his Miranda rights nor provided an attorney at any time during
this encounter. (Tr., p.16, L.4 – p.17, L.10; p.44, Ls.22-24.)
Mr. Franks was charged with trafficking in heroin and possessing major contraband
inside the jail. (R., pp.11, 30.) He filed a motion to suppress asserting that the evidence was
obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights, and that his responses to the
officer’s question – nodding his head and handing the sock to the officer – were involuntary and
coerced. (R., pp.77-80.) The State filed a brief in opposition. (R., pp.104-10.)
The district court denied suppression. In a ruling from the bench, the district court held
there was no “custodial interrogation” for purposes of Miranda and that the statements were
voluntarily made and not coerced. (Tr., p.73, L.10 – p.75, L.9.)5 Following the denial of his
suppression motion, Mr. Franks negotiated an agreement with the State and entered conditional
Alford6 plea to the trafficking count, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision.
(R., pp.258-262; 6/7/2018 Tr., p.11, L.15 – p.30, L.20.) The district court imposed judgment and
sentenced Mr. Franks to eighteen years, with ten years fixed, to run concurrently with all other
sentences. (R., p.266.) Mr. Franks filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.270.)

5

The district court also made a number of findings and conclusions relating to Mr. Franks’
reduced privacy rights and the Fourth Amendment. (Tr., p.62, L.19 – p.73, L.9.) However,
Mr. Franks did not allege a Fourth Amendment violation and these findings and conclusion have
no bearing on the issues presented in this case.
6
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1979).
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Franks’ motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Franks’ Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held a person must be informed

of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to being subjected to custodial
interrogation; otherwise, any incriminating statements made by the person are inadmissible at
trial. 384 U.S. at 444-45. Miranda warnings are required whenever an individual is subjected to
“custodial interrogation.” Here, not only were Mr. Franks’ statements given without the required
Miranda warnings, they were involuntarily made and coerced, requiring suppression of the
statements and all physical fruits. The district court’s contrary conclusions are erroneous and its
decision to deny suppression should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation omitted).
“This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citations omitted).

5

C.

Mr. Franks Was Subjected To A Custodial Interrogation Requiring Miranda Warnings
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “... shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself ...” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Miranda, the United States
Supreme Court held the privilege against self-incrimination requires that incriminating
statements obtained during “custodial interrogation” be inadmissible as evidence against a
defendant unless the defendant was provided a full and effective warning of his rights. 384 U.S.
436. The Miranda Court specified,
No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized
unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. …
This warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of
circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will
suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable
assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
384 U.S. at 471-72 (internal citations omitted).
As set forth below, Mr. Franks was subjected to custodial interrogation and the failure to
provide Miranda warnings requires that his incriminating statements be suppressed.
1.

Mr. Franks Was Subjected To “Interrogation” Within The Meaning Of Miranda

Mr. Franks’ questioning by Officer Zuberer was an “interrogation” within the meaning of
Miranda.
[T]he term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. … A
practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (emphasis added).
Here, Officer Zuberer’s asking Mr. Franks whether he had “anything illegal on him” (see
Ex.A; Tr, p.21, Ls.13-16) was a question any officer should know is reasonably likely to elicit an

6

incriminating response. It is an “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda. Thus, regardless of
whether the question was one of Officer Zuberer’s “common questions” (Tr., p.39, Ls.3-7) or
whether, as found by the district court, that that question was “standard protocol” (Tr., p.66,
Ls.4-20), the question was not exempt from Miranda’s requirements. In Mathis v. United States,
391 U.S. 1, 3 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly rejected the government’s argument that
“routine” tax investigations, unrelated to a prisoner’s underlying offense, are immune from
Miranda. Here, the officer’s direct question asking whether Mr. Franks had “anything illegal,”
even if routine or part of established jail protocol, was a question that police “should know is
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response” and amounts to interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda.
2.

Mr. Franks Was “In Custody” For Purposes Of Miranda

Mr. Franks was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, as inmates are not exempt from
Miranda’s requirements. Two years after Miranda, in Mathis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a suspect’s answers incriminating him in tax fraud, given to federal investigators while he was
imprisoned serving state conviction, were held inadmissible because no Miranda warnings had
been given. 391 U.S. at 3. The Court acknowledged Miranda’s applicability to questioning
“ ‘when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way,’ ” id. at 5, (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478); but the Court
did not say whether the interview with Mathis fell within Miranda because of his incarceration,
or because of some other deprivation that was significant in the circumstances. However, in
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that by itself,
“lawful imprisonment imposed on conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures
identified in Miranda.”
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Later, in Howes v. Fields, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule that
prisoners who are taken aside for questioning are “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. 565
U.S. 499, 511 (2012). The Court stated that “service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is
not enough to constitute Miranda custody.” 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012). Instead, the Court said,
When a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all of
the features of the interrogation. These include the language that is used in
summoning the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the
interrogation is conducted. An inmate who is removed from the general prison
population for questioning and is thereafter subjected to treatment in connection
with the interrogation that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.
Id. at 514 (internal citations, quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted).
In Howes v. Fields, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the prisoner being interrogated
was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because he was free to terminate the interview and
leave. 565 U.S. at 515. In making this determination, the Court balanced those factors showing
he was in Miranda custody against those showing that he was not. Id. The factors showing a
custodial interrogation included that: the prisoner did not invite or consent to the interview; he
was not advised that he was free to decline to speak; the interview lasted a long time, extending
beyond the prisoner’s usual bedtime; the deputies conducting the questioning were armed; and
one of the deputies “used a sharp tone.” Id.
However, the Court concluded that these factors were offset by others indicating that the
prisoner was free to leave:
Most important, respondent [prisoner] was told at the outset of the interrogation,
and was reminded again thereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell
whenever he wanted. Moreover, respondent was not physically restrained or
threatened and was interviewed in a well-lit, average-sized conference room,
where he was “not uncomfortable.” He was offered food and water, and the door
to the conference room was sometimes left open.
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Id. The Court concluded that, “[a]ll of these objective facts are consistent with an interrogation
environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and
leave.” Id.
It is apparent from Howes v. Fields that courts must examine all of the features of the
interrogation to determine whether a prisoner is free to terminate an interview and leave. Id. A
prisoner who is not so free will be considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. Making
this determination will depend “on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). The question is whether the objective
circumstances “add up to custody” for Miranda purposes. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.
261, 278 (2011). Consistent with these principals, the Idaho Supreme Court has observed, “The
only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood
his situation.”

State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 405 (2016) (quoting Stansbury, at 324)

(emphasis added). The burden of showing custody rests with the defendant seeking to exclude
evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 557
(2010).

As set forth below, Mr. Franks met that burden and the district court’s contrary

conclusion is in error.
The objective circumstances in this case show that Mr. Franks was questioned during an
encounter in which uniformed officers had barged into his cell; he was ordered up against the
wall, and to face it, and his hands were restrained in handcuffs behind his back. (Tr., p.11, L.11
– p.12, L.18; p.42, Ls.20-25.) He was told he would be strip-searched, then led away from the
general jail population to the booking area and into the shower room where he was isolated with
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an officer, Officer Zuberer, who questioned directly him. (Tr., p.10, Ls.10-24, p.14, Ls.12-24;
Ex.A.)
As testified to by Officer Zuberer, Mr. Franks was not free to leave.
Q:

Was he free to, when you ordered him to go down to the booking area,
was he free to stop and go back to his cell?

A:

Not at that time, no.

Q:

Was he in custody?

A:

Yes.

(Tr., p.41, L.23 – p.24, L.3.)
The undisputed evidence also established that inmates like Mr. Franks were not normally
handcuffed when being moved throughout parts of the jail; this degree of restraint was unusual.
(Tr., p.19, L.21 – p.20, L.6; p.45, Ls.4-10.)
Thus, unlike the prisoner in Howes v. Fields, Mr. Franks was subjected to a heightened
coercive environment, such that a reasonable person in Mr. Franks’ position would not have felt
free to terminate the interrogation and leave and return to his cell.
Also, unlike the prisoners in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, and in Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98,
who were serving prison sentences after being convicted, Mr. Franks was in custody as a pretrial detainee.

The coercive pressures of custody with which Miranda was concerned are

arguably present where someone is incarcerated before trial. See United States v. Ellison, 632
F.3d 727 (1st Cir. 2010) (recognizing the difference in the conditions of a pre-trial detainee and a
convict for purpose of Miranda custody.) The condition of a suspect being held while awaiting
trial, like Mr. Franks, is different from the convict’s position, since the suspect might reasonably
perceive that the authorities have a degree of discretion over pretrial conditions, at least to the
point of making recommendations to a court. Id.

10

Focusing on all of the features of the interrogation here, Mr. Franks was subjected to
treatment that rendered him “in custody” for practical purposes, and he was entitled to the
protection of Miranda.
D.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing That Mr. Franks’ Incriminating
Statements Were Voluntarily And Not Coerced; The Statements Should Be Suppressed
The district court also erred in concluding that Mr. Franks’ incriminating statements were

“voluntary” and not the product of coercion. (Tr., p.73, Ls.15-16, p.74, Ls.15-16.) The use
against a criminal defendant of a statement that the defendant made involuntarily violates the
Due Process Clause. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); State v. Hayes, 158 Idaho
476, 485 (Ct. App. 2015). A statement that is the product of police coercion, either physical or
psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by methods offensive to due process must be
suppressed, as well as all fruits of such statement. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
To determine whether a defendant’s incriminating statements were given voluntarily, a
court must examine the totality of the circumstances and ask whether the defendant’s will was
overborne by police conduct.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991);

State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 (1993). A court should consider the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation, including whether Miranda warnings were given, the
youth of the accused, the accused’s level of education or low intelligence, the length of the
detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the deprivation of food or
sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Troy, 124 Idaho at 214. The
presence or absence of Miranda warnings is a particularly significant factor. Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004). If, under the totality of circumstances, the defendant’s free will
was overborne by threats, through direct or implied promises or other forms of coercion, then the
defendant’s statement is not voluntary and is inadmissible. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87;
11

Troy, 124 Idaho at 214. When a defendant alleges an interrogation is coercive, the State bears
the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 489 (1972); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 685 (2004); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,
878 (1987).
The State did not meet its burden of proving that Mr. Franks’ incriminating statements
were voluntarily given, and the totality of the circumstances reveals that they were not. Most
critically, Mr. Franks should have been given Miranda warnings prior to being subjected a
custodial interrogation, but he was not. (Tr., p.16, Ls.4-8.) Additionally, he was questioned
during an encounter in which uniformed officers barged into his cell, ordered him up against the
wall, and to face it, and restrained his hands in handcuffs behind his back. (Tr., p.11, L.11 –
p.12, L.18; p.42, Ls.20-25.) He was then told he would be strip-searched and was led away to a
shower area and then, isolated with an officer who questioned him directly, Mr. Franks made his
incriminating response. (Tr., p.10, Ls.10-24, p.14, Ls.12-24; Ex.A.)
The district court found there was “no coercion” and that Mr. Franks’ incriminating
statement was a “voluntary response.” (Tr., p.73, Ls.15-16, p.74, L.s15-16.) The district court
cited to the facts that Mr. Franks was an adult, not a minor; that he had been in the jail for some
five weeks and was accustomed to it; and that he was familiar with the criminal justice system
having been subjected to numerous strip searches in the past.

(Tr., p.69, Ls.14-23.)

Additionally, however, the district court found that Mr. Franks “understands his Miranda rights”
and “clearly knew” he did not have to answer the question. (Tr., p.74, Ls.21-23.) This finding is
not supported by the record and is clearly erroneous.
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Franks was asked if he knew what Miranda rights were.
(Tr., p.15, L.19 – p.16, L.7); however, he was not asked, and there is no evidence in the record

12

showing, whether he was aware of those rights at or before the time he made his incriminating
statements. (See generally, Tr., p.11, L.2 – p.26, L.9.) There is no evidence that Mr. Franks had
ever been given Miranda warnings in the past; the only evidence was that some seven months
after he made his unwarned statements, and after his attorney filed his motion to suppress
briefing the issue, Mr. Franks knew what Miranda rights included. This is not substantial
competent evidence to support a finding that Mr. Franks understood his rights at the time he
made his unwarned incriminating statements.
Considering the circumstances of the interrogation as whole, the district court erred in
failing to conclude that Mr. Franks’ will was overborne by the officer’s conduct and that his
incriminating statements were involuntary and coerced. Suppression should have been granted.
E.

The “Inevitable Discovery Doctrine” Does Not Save The Illegally-Obtained Evidence
From Exclusion
Although not argued by the State, the district court made an alternative ruling that the

objected-to evidence was admissible under the “inevitable discovery doctrine.” (Tr., p.71, L.23
– p.72, L.10.) The district court reasoned that the inevitable discovery doctrine was applicable
because Officer Zuberer had determined that the other seven suspected inmates would also be
strip-searched. (Tr., p.71, L.23 – p.72, L.10.)
The “inevitable discovery doctrine” does not apply in this case, however, because that
doctrine only saves the fruits of an unlawful action when the State shows that those fruits
“ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Downing, 163
Idaho 26, 31 (2017) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). The exception does
not apply just because the evidence could have been discovered had the same officer acted
lawfully instead of unlawfully. State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787 (Ct. App. 2015). The
exception does not permit a hypothetical “do-over.” See id. (“Indeed, the inevitable discovery
13

doctrine was never intended to swallow the exclusionary rule by substituting what the police
should have done for what they really did or were doing.”) The inevitable discovery doctrine
therefore is not applicable here, and the district court’s contrary conclusion is erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Franks respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court’s order denying
suppression, vacate his judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin, and remand his case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of March, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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